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THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL IN CRIMINOLOGY
STEPHEN SCHAFER*
Hardly any intellectual or practical discipline is in gators, with some exceptions, place heavy emphasis
a more confused state at present than criminology, on the correct construction and use of statistical
and fundamental questions about the nature of and methodological rules, clouding the preference
crime and punishment remain to confound and for deterministic quantifying techniques by paying
should often embarrass the thinker. Crime has been lip service to the promise of theoretical propositions.
intensively studied for more than a century, but it This is one of the major reasons that the disis doubtful whether we are now much nearer to an tinction between accidental and causal regularities
understanding of man's criminal conduct. It appears has been much too often missed or misinterpreted.
that a considerable amount of theoretical work Only through skepticism and its attendant sense of
remains to be done, in particular on the problem the difficulty of understanding what one sees can one
of the freedom of the will. However complicated sustain anything like equanimity and avoid cynicism
it might be for various scientific and ethical reasons, and despair.
There is, beyond doubt, a great benefit from oban ideological stand should be taken that may
serve as a foundation on which empirical research serving and recording man's behavior, and it is not
can be more intelligently built. Without such a intended to deflect attention from the many solid
base, the contemporary turmoil over the crime virtues of a deterministic kind- of quantifying; yet
problem may provide ample scope for criminological there is a danger in accepting these records without
mischief.
making efforts to resolve the relevant theoretical
The issue of free will seldom features in con- issues. It hardly needs saying that the roots of crime
ventional criminology textbooks or among titles in are buried much deeper and their ramifications are
professional journals, nor does this profoundly vastly more complicated than is usually acknowlcritical problem receive attention in research reports. edged by our deterministically-oriented quantifying
Yet, a tour d'horizon of the immense volume of researchers, who do not explain why this stand on
empirical investigations seems to indicate a covert the problem of free will has been taken. This might
suggestion that a deterministic inclination-or even be one of the reasons so many of these projects,
strategy-characterizes the work of the quantifying and even their topics, are remarkably superficial, a
researchers of our time. This is not to say that deficiency which leads them to a banal conclusion.
they would overtly state or even consciously assume There are many theoretical problems, a major one
that we have no free choice and that our conduct being the issue of the freedom of the will, which
is determined only by external forces, whether make a critic cautious about lightly accepting those
superhuman, social or other powers, which anni- numbers and figures.
hilate the human will. It may be the case that
The problem of man's free will is critically imwhile they lean toward determinism, present re- .portant to criminological views, despite its almost
searchers do not even contemplate the problem of insoluble nature and the inordinate Sisyphean intelfree will; in attempts to follow the nineteenth- lectual labor required even to take sides in the cencentury scientific thinking about the concept of turies-old dispute. Three hundred years ago Gottcausality they are so obsessed with techniques em- fried Wilhelm Leibniz simply called it "the great
ploying numbers and tables that they lose sight of question,"' and Nicolas Malebranche viewed it as a
basic qualitative issues. For many years quantita- "mystery"; I two centuries ago Immanuel Kant,
tive research has been a flourishing industry in
which both the funding agencies and the investi'G. LEIBNIZ, NOVA METHODus DOCENDAE DISCENDAE GUEJUiSs PRUDENTIAE (1686).
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historically the first to expose this problem as a confrontation between science and ethics, bitterly complained that a thousand years' work had been expended in vain on its solution,' and Jonathan
Edwards saw it as the "grand question" that can be
approached only with "candor and calm attention." "
In the twentieth century Nicolai Hartmann found it
the real exemplum crucis of ethics, the perfect solu-

tion of which at the present time. cannot be expected; 'and Heinrich Gomperz has called attention
to the fact that conservative and liberal thinkers, inconsistently and illogically with respect to their
ideology, tend to reverse their traditional stand on
the problem. 6 Indeed, as M. R. Ayers expressed it,
"The freewill problem is certainly the heaviest millstone around the neck of anyone
who inquires into
7
the nature of potentiality."
On this account it should not be surprising that
nothing is further from these thoughts than lightly
offering a solution to this troublesome and perplexing "grand mystery." But while this writing has
none of the comprehensiveness or coherence suggested by its title, it is the purpose of this paper to
point to this problem as the pivotal question of
criminology, so sadly neglected by many who venture to treat the struggling issue of crime. The problem of the freedom of will-often called freedom of
action ' or the freedom of the self-actually mirrors
the interminable debate on the controversial issue of
causality in terms of determinism against indeterminism, ultimately leading to the question of man's
freedom of choice in acting or in general behaving
himself, and to his consequent responsibility for his
conduct. Determinism suggests that man's willif there is such a thing as "will"-does not motivate
action and that our conduct results from extraneous
sources. Indeterminism, however, suggests that
because the human will is not motivated by physical
and environmental factors, man can do anything
he wants to do; if "will" did not exist, causal reality
would be an illusion.
It is clear from the legion of arguments that an
unconditional acceptance of the law of causality (determinism) would be as grandiose an hypothesis as
I I. KANT, KRITIK DER PRAxTISCHEN JERNUNFT (1788).
'J. EDWARDS, FREEDOM OF THE WILL (1754).
5
N. HARTMANN, ETHIK 572-79 (2d ed. 1935).
6

H. GOMPERZ,
3-11 (1907).
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IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 1 (1968) [hereinafter

cited as AYERS].
'ESSAYS ON FREEDOM OF ACTION at vii (T. Honderich
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would be the endorsement of unlimited free will
(indeterminism) as a metaphysical concept. Should
the determinists be correct, criminals, as we understand them now, would not exist, since all impulses
from which actions stem are irresistable and consequently only the determining extraneous physical
and environmental factors ought to be blamed for
crime. Punishing, correcting, or reforming man
would be an illogical and meaningless effort. On the
other hand, should the indeterminists be right, since
culpability is based on "willingness" to commit
crimes, punishment ought to be equal for all criminals, unless the value of the criminally-attacked
target could in itself justify distinctions. Since man
willed his action, and could have acted otherwise, he would be fully and exclusively responsible
for his choice of violating the law, regardless of
the conduct of his victim and irrespective of his
social and physical environment. All empirical research projects in criminology would be rendered
meaningless.
The assumption underlying all penal systems
seems at first glance to be indeterministic. The
philosophy of officially punishing the criminal lawbreaker indicates the lawmaker's premise that the
criminal had freedom of choice, and that this choice
was to commit a crime. Criminal law assumes that
man has freedom of action and, as Morris Ginsberg
contended, he is able to form a "more or less impartial judgment of the alternative actions" and can act
"in accordance with that judgment." 9 Ted Honderich poses the thesis that to say that something
can happen in a given situation is to say that something else is not "caused" to happen. 10 It would be
pointless, so the argument runs, to offer the option of
reward or punishment if the freedom of choice were
not a fact. Criminal law, it appears, operates on several presumptions: (1)that we humans have the free
will to decide our action, (2) that we are intelligent
and reasoning creatures who can recognize values
(whatever the term "value" may cover) and (3) that
we can distinguish between right and wrong (whatever these terms may mean). In other words, criminal law seems to assume that only those persons
who will to commit a crime or neglect to will otherwise can and should be punished. They should be directly responsible for what they will to do, and they
should be held responsible for being careless or negligent in not willing to avoid crime.
At the same time, criminological research, mainly
9
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the quantifying kind in the last three decades, seems
to assume the power of external forces which do not
allow man freely to exercise his will and makes the
actions of the criminal agent causally explicable. As
seen in the so-called prediction studies, "it can be
known a priori that every event has a cause;" " accordingly, in contrast to the practice of the administration of criminal law, empirical investigators may
be seen reaching for the proposition that nobody is
ever really, or at least not fully, responsible for his
actions. In their search for a cure for crime they believe that crimes, at least most of them, are unfree
and involuntary actions, and, although the crimes
are obviously not reflexes, they are committed
against the will of their performers: 12 with certain
regularities, extraneous influences actually determine or guide the lawbreakings. What the empirical
researchers really say is that if something does not
happen in a given situation it means that something
else is caused to happen; they give the impression of
actively looking for guilty factors other Chan the criminal himself. However, even their deterministicallyflavored research would prove to be purposeless
should the totalitarianistic and strictly deterministically-thinking behavior modificators be correct;
whatever deterministic external factors might be revealed by the researchers, in the behavior modifiers'
Fourier-type phalansteries, such technical brainwashing-or, more correctly, "will-washing"would take place under the pretext of punishment
or treatment which makes any research result irrelevant and would overpower all kinds of external
forces by determining the choice of man. The determinist behavior modificators seem to be more deterministic than are the deterministic researchers.
Unless we are ready to deny that freedom is one of
the higher attributes of man, and discarding the philosophical and theological aspects of the behavior
modificators' ideas which prefer evil to good, the
chances of reaching the solution of the problem of
free will are necessarily slim. Are we wholly a part
of the natural world so that our actions are the necessary outcome of causal processes, or are our actions
free so that we can be held responsible for them? Can
we suggest that only one of these questions has an
answer which would deny the validity of any answer
to the other? As materialistic monism concludes in
strict determinism, spiritual monism leads to an

absolute indeterminism; and they are so formidably
in opposition to each other that neither of them
would tolerate the other in the arena of a single
monistic view. Many philosophical ideologies tend to
divide the human universe into two parts: the world
of empirical realities (mundus sensibilis), on the one
hand, and the world of values and ideas (mundus
intelligibilis) on the other; but apparently, these
ideological views do not offer room for strict indeterminism in the former world and for strict determinism in the latter world. Any monistic view would
expose the two independent worlds to an unavoidable and confusing clash, and man would be tormented by not recognizing which of them is his
real world. Thus, since man could hardly exist in two
independent worlds at the same time, only with a
dualistic view can human society function where
man's position and role in this functioning universe
demand the merger of the two worlds. Victor Cathrein contends that the freedom of the human will
does not make the acceptance of the laws of causality
impossible; '3 and Constantin Gutberlet claims that
the will is so strongly subjugated to causal laws
that if this were the only question in the debate of
determinism and indeterminism, then even his own
indeterministic stand could be qualified as a deterministic view. 14 Gyula Mo6r also supports the
dualistic outlook by suggesting that in the willed
choice the idea of value plays an important role since
man has the capability of choosing and his choices
may develop causal effects. "
This is why, as it appears, only a moderate determinism or a moderate indeterminism (the former
with a limited range of causality, the latter with
an arrested freedom of will) offers at least some answer to the problem of "free will." From a pragmatic
point of view, and in order to approach the crime
issue somewhat more safely, usable answers have to
contain a mixture of both the indeterministic and the
deterministic elements. They differ primarily in
terms of how much of each element fills in such a
compromise. An estimate of the volume of freedom of
will (in other words, the relative dominance of the
deterministic or the indeterministic view in judging
crime) may be necessary because there is no philosophical guarantee either that the adherents of the indeterministic view possess a real freedom of will in
reaching their conclusion or that the supporters of
3
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the deterministic thesis express their judgment only tion of every agent depends in its particular circumstances upon some specific physical condition being
as mouthpieces of external forces. "Compatilism,"
the coexistence of the two independent worlds of satisfied, then actions cannot be torn free from the
freedom and physical determinism, is often proposed, nexus of physical effects and fully determining
but "incompatilism," the inability of these two causes." The agent thus could not have done otherworlds to coexist, is even more often contended. wise and, continues Wiggins, "if that is the characYet in a dualistic view only "libertarianism" and ter of the causal nexus we live within, then it makes
not "necessitarianism" seems to offer a viable foun- no particular difference to this point whether or not
dation for judging a person's action or conduct, a actions are identical with movements of matter." 19
While it is the belief of the libertarians that deterposition which leans toward freedom but saves deterministic causality. This is without claiming the ab- minism cannot operate in the real world without acsolute freedom of will which may lead to the liberum cepting the validity of indeterminism, and "it is chararbitrium indifferentiae (where the will in a guide- acteristic of the libertarian to insist that for at least
less position may fall into chaos) and without stating some of the things which the man with freedom
the absolute rule of the causa finalis, the ultimate does, or plans, or decides to do, he must have a genucause, which is not really known. Under such an ab- ine alternative open to him;" 20 strict indeterminism
solute rule the determiniqic strength of competing does not exist. As Anthony Kenny pointed out, "the
causes can be measured only ex post facto, since fact that we can do what we want does not mean that
obvioisly the one is the stronger that finally "wins" we can want what we want." 2 A fully indetermined choice ought to be totally beyond the reach of
and determines the action. 16
For the unsophisticated, determinism-and per- all influences, but, as was admitted even by the
haps even incompatilism-is more readily un- staunch indeterminist Jonathan Edwards, because
derstandable than the freedom of will. It is easy for the choice can be influenced, it can be determined
him to assert that as something cannot come out of and therefore is not totally free choice. This might
nothing, everything must have a cause. But, contends be true even in the case of mental disease, as Anthony
Plamenatz, "whereas it is not at all clear that he Flew contrasted it with physical illness, since menrequires an event always to have the same cause, tal derangement is culturally relative. 22 Jonathan
he does seem to require the former to be produced by Edwards' free choice refers, for example, to asses
the latter in some sense which makes the causal law who can choose between alternative bales of hay. But
something more than a necessity of succession there is an important difference between asses and
or concomitance." 17 This position, however, gives men: when asses make their choice the issue of
rise to such questions as how the cause can produce moral responsibility, 'or moral blameworthiness or
its effect if it ceases to exist at the moment when the praiseworthiness, does not appear in the question.
latter comes into existence. Determinism, by the na- This is because asses are not moral agents, and
ture of its apparent logic, can be easier to compre- only moral agents can properly be subject to moral
hend than indeterminism where the will is less tangi- judgment. What then is meant by a "moral agent"
ble and provable; yet even devoted determinists often in common speech and in the evaluation of the crimiseem to feel a sort of fallacy in their view, and look nal law system? According to Edwards, a moral
for a place for the freedom of choice. Sometimes they agent is a being who satisfies two conditions. First,
even try to arrive at their deterministic position by he has a moral faculty, that is, he is capable of disusing the free will as a starting point for argument. tinguishing between right and wrong. And second,
Heinrich Rickert, for example, clearly a determinist, he has the capacity to reason. The latter might be the
places the free will in a "prophysical" world, which more important of the two conditions, since it makes
is supposed to be a metaphysical sphere that func- the agent subject to influences in his actions by
tions before we become acquainted with the realities; "moral inducements or motives," whether these inthus he adjusted the Aristotelian ideas in favor of the ducements take the form of commands, exhortations
will's freedom. 18 David Wiggins, a "reasonable or persuasive arguments. 2 In translating these
libertarian," complains against determinism by sug"9ESSAYS supra note 8, at 41, 59.
gesting that "if determinism is true and every ac0
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theses and thoughts into the understanding of the
issue of crime, "it follows from these premises that
our actions are never free or voluntary," yet "the
theses of determinism.., are incompatible with the
24
existence of this responsibility." Although Thomas
Hobbes is known as a determinist, at least a scientific determinist, still in his description of "liberty"
a man can act freely even though he acted necessarily and could not have acted otherwise. 25
However, in thesi, one may claim that even moderate indeterminism does not exist and that, because
of the force of socialization processes, the will has no
freedom whatsoever. 26 The socializing measures develop man's bias and prejudice, likes and dislikes,
beliefs and disbeliefs, affirmations and negations regarding the basic and guiding questions of the world
in which he is expected to live, to choose, to decide
and to function. The ideas of this world and the
prescriptions of the ruling social-political power are
infused into man before his faculties of knowing, reasoning, evaluating and choosing have had a chance to
develop to maturity. "[Prescribed socialization
'2 7
makes the individual what he is." He knows,
reasons, assesses and makes his choices; but normally what he would will to know, how he would
will to reason, and what choices he would will to
make are influenced by the ideas socialized into him
and limited by the social-political power that in fact
dictates the range of his choices. Moreover, he is expected to will as other persons, who are more powerful than he, will him to will. He is not deprived of
his choices, and almost always he "can do otherwise." But how many and which of these choices will
be at his disposal, what he can do otherwise, and
what he can want to want are influenced, limited and
arrested by the socialization processes, which in turn
are assumed to operate according to the influencing,
limiting and arresting prescriptive will of the ruling
power of the given world. The question, therefore, is
24
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not whether physically he can do otherwise; rather,
it is the question of whether he can will to do otherwise. If the role of the socialization processes is posed
here correctly, he cannot will to do otherwise. Consequently, it might be safe to say that man does have
a freedom of will, yet it is a will that has been influenced, limited, and arrested even before it has
evolved to the stage where man could will to will
freely.
A qualitative concentration on this point may
guide the quantifying researchers better to understand what they are doing, and it may assist the
administrators of criminal law better to understand
what they are judging. Clearly, the less effective the
socialization process, the broader is the freedom of
man's will; and the more successful the socializing
operation, the narrower is the freedom of will and
the range of choices from which man can will his actions. Where the socialization process is weak, there
is more space to will an action that is qualified as
crime; where socialization is strong, only such actions can be willed which do not pull one into the
territory of criminality. The state of crime in different cultures may support this proposition. In the
former alternative man may will to belong to a world
other than the one he inhabits under the rule of its
social-political power; in that case, he sees no
reason to restrain his will or not to will what he can
will, 28 and his undesirably extensive or even unlimited freedom of will may create a potentiality of
crime or even a revolt against those dominating
social-political powers who will his freedom to be influenced, limited, and arrested by their reasons, assessments and choices.
If the foregoing is true, is it correct to blame and
punish the criminal? Is he, rather than those who
failed correctly to influence, limit, and arrest his will,
really responsible for his crime; or are we making
him responsible? Do we, for example, have juvenile delinquents or criminal parents? As it appears, man does have a freedom of will, but one's
indeterminism, at least in its range, is determined by
other indeterminists.
28
Id. at 139-40.

